uses a separate model to put the facts in a specific perspective, then evaluates the findings the given model suggests. Upon completion of this threefold investigation I will consider the limitations of Allison's models and suggest the usefulness of complementing the third model with the insights of cognitive theory. fierce guerrilla struggle. Carried out deftly enough to conceal the American hand, this invasion scenario promised to deal with Castro while preserving the United States's image.2 In short, then, the rational actor model suggests that the lack of other viable alternatives prompted the choice of the invasion, which appeared best in terms of a rational cost-benefit analysis.
Such an interpretation, however, is questionable on several grounds. First, it was less than fully rational to assume that a plan that had worked in Guatemala would meet with equal success in Cuba. Castro had over 200,000 men in arms and the benefit of the Guatemalan precedent. He therefore expected an American-sponsored coup and took numerous precautions.3 Nor was it rational, no matter how elaborate the deceit, to expect that the United States could deny involvement in the invasion and escape international censure.
Finally, the rational actor interpretation suffers from the fact that the president and his advisers did not carefully weigh competing alternatives and then select the invasion of Cuba as the best policy. In reality, in response to the Eisenhower administration's growing concern about Cuba, the CIA conceived a plan in the middle of 1960 to topple Castro, submitted it to the president, and received authorization to proceed with the preparations.4 Although President Dwight D. Eisenhower withheld final approval, by the time John F. Kennedy took office in January 1961 the plan had acquired a momentum of its own. Thus, Kennedy's first policy decision on Cuba was not to choose a course of action among the various options available. Instead, it was to decide for or against an invasion project to which considerable resources had already been committed, and that a powerful agency vigorously promoted. The CIA's advocacy warrants looking at the operation from the perspective of bureaucratic politics.
A BUREAUCR-ATIC POLITICS INTERPRETATION
Allison's second model, based on organizational processes, holds that bureaucratic agencies and not simply the chief executive frequently make impottant decisions. Bureaucracies have their own goals, in particular; the promotion of their institutional interests, or "organizational health." Likewise, organizations possess their own logic, including sets of routines and standard operating procedures (SOP). As a result, bureaucracies tend to develop their own views, which they can often translate into policy. This power stems in part from their control over information. An organization that controls information on a given issue can shape the appearance the issue takes, and thus largely predetermine the executive's response. The organizational process model therefore explains policy decisions as bureaucratic outputs based on organizational control of knowledge and conformity to institutional patterns of behavior. This approach enables analysts to reconstruct the sequence of events leading to the Cuban invasion. The account comprises two parts: how the CIA decided in favor of the invasion; and how the agency obtained executive endorsement of the project.
As noted above, the CIA originated the plan to overthrow Castro and pressed it on the president. In so doing, the agency was probably displaying typical organizational imperialism. Over the course of the 1950s, this newcomer to the federal bureaucracy had assumed a major foreign policy role. Considerable evidence suggests that, encouraged by previous successes, the CIA sought a fresh occasion to prove its effectiveness and consolidate its position.5
The CIA explored different ways of eliminating Castro. But attempts on his life proved difficult to undertake and highly uncertain, while the weakness of the Cuban underground eroded the agency's faith in an insurgency. Bureaucratic logic eventually prompted the choice of an invasion executed by exile proxies.
The study of organizational behavior has revealed that an organization's behavior at a given moment usually differs only marginally from its previous behavior. An organization facing a new situation thus typically reduces the unfamiliar issue to a familiar problem and solution. Here the Guatemalan episode, in which the CIA toppled a leftist dictator with a handful of exiles and a skillful campaign of psychological intimidation, supplied the familiar precedent. The operation was a lucky longshot, but it covered the CIA with glory and became a manner of agency program for disposing of troublesome Third World dictators. A similar operation was attempted against Indonesia's Achmed Sukarno in 1958. Although the venture failed, the CIA again turned to the Guatemalan model in dealing with Castro. CIA officials repeatedly referred to the precedent while preparing the Bay of Pigs. The agency assigned many of the operatives involved in the Guatemalan coup to the Cuban project, and envisioned a similar I By 1960, the CIA had a history of clashes with other bureaucratic actors, particularly the Defense Department, for control of activities such as aerial reconnaissance atid paramilitary operations. Roswell Gilpatric Oral History, Kennedy Library, 41. type of psychological warfare.6 The organizational process model's explanation of bureaucratic choices therefore suggests that it was natural for the CIA to imitate the Guatemalan scenario in its Cuban venture.
The agency's prime SOP, secrecy, also rendered the invasion option attractive. Secrecy meant that within the CIA itself only a few operatives of the Directorate of Plans (covert operations) were cleared for the project. Hence many potential dissenters were eliminated, with incalculable consequences. The CIA's scenario, for instance, made limited sense unless the landing had a reasonable chance of triggering uprisings or at least widespread defections from Castro's regime. But for reasons of secrecy the agency's own authoritative Board of National Estimates, which believed that Castro had a firm grip on the island, was never asked to evaluate the Cubans' likely reaction to an invasion. Instead, the operatives used fragmentary and selected reports to draw optimistic conclusions about the potential for anti-Castro reactions.7
Once the CIA's repertoire and routines led it to choose an invasion, the next step was securing the official go-ahead. This took place in several stages. The CIA pushed its program with all its might. The only organization in a position to impede the program, the military, went along out of bureaucratic parochialism and prudence. The president then agreed to the plan while insisting on certain constraints. But organizational behavior prompted the agency to deal with these restraints in its own way.
By the time the CIA had opted for an invasion, the agency fit organizational theory's description of a typical sub-unit that, instructed to explore an option, becomes an advocate for its adoption.8 In securing presidential approval for its plan, the CIA enjoyed a prized bureaucratic resource -control over information. The agency first acquired a quasi-monopoly of information on the invasion by stressing the need for secrecy, thereby keeping all but a handful of White House advisers and top-level bureaucrats ignorant of the plan. Unfortunately, the latter were mostly generalists, and secrecy cut them off from non-CIA officials who knew Cuba well. The Cuban specialists of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, for instance, could have provided a realistic appraisal of the Cubans' likely reaction to an invasion. The CIA's concern with secrecy was obsessive, at least in Washington. The agency never supplied any written documents to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and collected the documents that circulated in White House meetings after each briefing. Secrecy made sense, but whether by design or not, it also increased the CIA's power to determine policy.9
Having become the privileged purveyor of knowledge, the CIA then supplied President Kennedy and his advisers with chosen reports on the unreliability of Castro's forces and the extent of Cuban dissent. The agency did not dwell, however, on its own Board of Estimates's memoranda that foresaw a continuous reinforcement of Castro's power, nor did it mention other pessimistic reports from independent observers. The CIA also ignored certain requests for information. Although both the JCS and Presidential Assistant Richard Goodwin asked on separate occasions for the planners' written assessment of the potential for uprisings in Cuba, they never saw such a document. Eventually the CIA became, in Arthur Schlesinger's words, "less than candid."'10 It reported that the exiles' morale was excellent, despite a near mutiny at the training base in Guatemala. After the invasion site changed from the coastal city of Trinidad to the Bay of Pigs, the agency continued to assure the president that if the brigade ran into difficulties it could "go guerrilla" in the Escambray Mountains. But if these mountains were indeed in the vicinity of Trinidad, eighty miles of impassible swamp lay between the Escambrays and the new landing site. Moreover, the exiles had long since ceased guerrilla training in favor of conventional tactics. Thus the CIA's selective information painted a rose-colored picture -that Castro was weak and the Cubans were rebellious. The invasion had a good chance of toppling him, and short of this, the operation would tie Castro down in an insurgency war!' Meanwhile exile proxies and CIA deceit would disguise the U.S. hand. Viewed in this light, the project seemed reasonable.
The CIA also sold its plan by skillfully formulating the range of options. The agency bracketed the invasion between two unacceptable alternatives -procrastinating or disbanding the brigade. According to the CIA, the first alternative would jeopardize the plan since Castro was about to receive massive military aid from the Soviets, including jet fighters. The agency also claimed that disbanding the brigade posed a "disposal problem," as hundreds of disgruntled Cubans would spread the word that the United States had backed off. Kennedy would appear weak, and the Communist world could be counted on to create trouble. Implicit in the warning was the hint that the president's domestic adversaries might do the same. As CIA Director Allen Dulles later stated: "We had made it very clear to the President that to call off the operation would have resulted in a very unpleasant situation."12 9 The CIA failed to communicate fully with the other government players, even after the loquacity of the Cuban exiles and the sheer size and visibility of the invasion preparations led to revelations in the press. The CIA's reasons are unclear. By resorting to the typical organizational strategy of defining the options and providing the information required to evaluate them, the CIA thus structured the problem in a way that maximized the likelihood the president would choose the agency's preferred option. One organization might have frustrated this strategy, however, as the president asked the military to evaluate what amounted to a fullfledged invasion. But institutional logic led the Pentagon seemingly to concur with the CIA. Since the operation was not the military's direct responsibility, bureaucratic parochialism meant that the Pentagon viewed its role as merely responding to requests for advice. Thus, the military did not weigh fine points of the plan and missed deficiencies built into the details. Bureaucratic parochialism also led the armed services to believe that it was not their role to unduly emphasize whatever weaknesses in the plan they did perceiveP3 In addition, the Pentagon probably heeded the unspoken rules of bureaucratic Washington. Since this was another agency's plan, and did not threaten any of the military's vital interests, it made no sense to antagonize another powerful organization by excessive outspokenness. In the words of one of the joint chiefs: "You couldn't expect us . . . to say this plan is no damn good, you ought to call it off; that's not the way you do things in government.... The CIA were doing their best in the planning, and we were accepting it. The responsibility was not ours." 14 Thus, when asked to evaluate the CIA's original plan for an invasion at Trinidad, the Pentagon did not dwell on the deficiencies it did perceive, and delivered a cautiously worded yet favorable evaluation. Then, after Kennedy rejected the Trinidad plan as too spectacular, the military's response proved less than frank. Asked to assess the CIA's three alternative proposals, the military expressed a guarded preference for Zapata, the plan to land at the Bay of Pigs. The Pentagon mentioned only once, however, its belief that Zapata was merely the least objectionable of the CIA's alternatives, and that the Trinidad plan remained the best. Organizational theory again suggests various reasons for the agency's attitude. Sheer organizational momentum makes it difficult to call off a year's planning hours before execution. Administrative theory also warns that bureaucracies can resist unwelcome orders, particularly those that require a departure from organizational repertoires. It was difficult to contravene the cancellation of the D-Day air strike, but the CIA most likely thought it could circumvent this order by bending the restriction barring direct U.S. participation. Indeed, considerable evidence shows that direct American involvement was an integral part of the agency's program for Guatemala-type interventions. In the original Guatemala venture, American CIA pilots conducted bombing missions, and the planners envisaged overt military intervention in case the operation failed. American agents again fought in the 1958 Indonesian affair. The CIA's early planning documents also show that in applying the Guatemala scenario to Cuba, the agency once again contemplated direct U.S. involvement!8
The evidence is equally compelling that even after Kennedy ruled out direct American participation, the CIA did not relinquish an idea that was firmly rooted in the organization's repertoires. The agency had learned that in large operations "you can't draw narrow boundaries of policy around them and be absolutely sure they will never be overstepped."19 In fact, as Dulles later revealed in an unpublished manuscript, the CIA had already seen a number of operations that had begun with strict prohibitions against direct U.S. involvement. Once the operations were actually underway, however, the limitations had tended to disappear.20 The CIA also knew that the United States would be loathe to abandon its allies, especially when its own prestige was at stake.
Hence, as Dulles explained, in the Cuban operation the agency assumed that when the invasion actually occurred, the president would end up authorizing whatever was required for success, including overt U.S. military intervention if necessary, rather than allow the venture to fail.21 As a result, the CIA probably did not object as strenuously as possible to the cancellation of the second air strike, confident that if the brigade ran into trouble, the White House would have no choice but to allow U.S. intervention. Indeed, when the invasion started to founder, the CIA pressed for American air support, but the president held his ground.
The organizational process model thus suggests that the decision to invade Cuba was reached in stages. The CIA first adopted the plan as an outcome of its goals and repertoires; the agency then steered it past the president by the skillful use of its monopoly of information. Meanwhile the bureaucratic routines and interests of the Pentagon muted a possible voice of dissent. Finally, despite last minute modifications jeopardizing the project, the agency proceeded with its plan as a result of three organizational characteristics-inertia, repertoires, and independence. 28 Lemnitzer, interview with author. 29 Burke subsequently concluded that with Kennedy "you couldn't state your view and assume it was heard. When you were opposed to something, you had to pound the table." Burke, interview with author.
like Adolf Hitler a quarter of a century before, the Communists had a plan of world aggression. Certain that "the battle [was] joined," Berle feared appeasement and believed that the sooner the U.S. stood up to the challenge, the better. Other participants from the State Department, such as Thomas Mann, also agreed to the invasion, fearing that Cuba might become a base from which the Communists could strike at the United States and other American countries.30 Aware of the difficulties the invasion could create for the United States, however, State Department representatives fought to reduce the scale and visibility of the operation, while not criticizing the basic idea itself.3" Dean Rusk believed that the secretary of state should not "influence the debate but preside over it," and only afterwards express his views to the president in private. He therefore was reluctant to voice his doubts in the meetings he attended. Moreover, as a man very attuned to the nuances of power, Rusk was aware that he lacked a power base of his own, and did not yet enjoy the president's full confidence. He may thus have deemed it unwise to come out strongly against a plan whose advocates the president held in high esteem.32 Indeed, such prudence probably characterized many of the civilian players. In these early days of the administration, it remained unclear when criticism ceased to be welcome and became foolhardy, especially when the subject was the overthrow of Castro, after the president had campaigned on the promise to check communism in general and Castro in particular.
Two members of the White House staff did harbor strong misgivings, but their dissent remained limited and cautious. Arthur Schlesinger and Richard Goodwin were junior appointees; the role the president meant for them was unclear and their power was uncertain. As an academic, Schlesinger was also hesitant to "speak up in church" against a paramilitary operation in the presence of the assembled CIA and military experts. Thus, neither adviser had the capacity or inclination to mount a major challenge to the CIA's hard sell.33
Several outside players could have had a major impact upon the decision. In late March 1961, Senator J. William Fulbright, alarmed by accounts surfacing in the press, suspected that the government was preparing a venture that he considered reprehensible. He offered Kennedy a memorandum outlining the legal, moral, and political objections to an invasion, whereupon the president invited him on April 4 to a meeting on the operation. There the senator restated his opposition, but all the other participants whom the president polled voted cern for organization meant that Kennedy paid scant attention to structuring the debate. He made no particular effort to absent himself from meetings to encourage uninhibited discussion. As noted, he also failed to make clear to his advisers that it was safe to be outspoken. All this increased the timidity of their criticism. Nor did the president pause to think that by agreeing to the CIA's exclusion of so many knowledgeable players from the debate, he was allowing the agency to become both advocate and chief judge of the project's feasibility. Finally, there is cause to suspect that the president's impatience with organizational details kept him from studying the project as carefully as was warranted. After all, a glance at a map would have told him that by changing the landing site from Trinidad to the Bay of Pigs, the guerrilla option had become all but infeasible.40
The stance of the different players is thus quite understandable in terms of their goals and values, and in the context in which the players operated. Bissell hoped to enhance his position through the operation; the JCS underestimated the need for candid criticism of the plan and shunned an unnecessary clash with the CIA. The White House advisers were in no position to challenge this apparent unanimity of the intelligence community and the Joint Chiefs. Faced with intense lobbying by the CIA players, the president considered the operation in the light of his political goals. Despite hesitations, he could also reconcile it with his own values, especially since, for all he knew, the operation was fail-safe with the escape hatch of "going guerrilla." The decision to proceed was therefore the resultant of the different forces and resistances within the decision channels.
The governmental politics model thus views the invasion as the outcome of a bargaining game. But players rarely start out with fully formed perceptions; these usually take final shape through the exchange of information that occurs during the bargaining. This exchange is subject to miscommunication and misperception. In last analysis then, the decision depends on how the players communicate as well as who they are.
In the Bay of Pigs there was severe miscommunication and misunderstanding, caused in part by tight deadlines and the pace of events. For example, after Kennedy rejected the Trinidad plan in early March 1961, the CIA hastily devised several "quieter" alternatives, and gave the Pentagon only two days to evaluate them. The agency's reluctance to divulge details or provide written documents compounded the problem, while the incrementalism of the decision-making also had deleterious effects. Up to and even after the final "go," given a few hours before the scheduled landing, the plan was constantly changing to accommodate objections from various quarters. Cancellation of the D-Day air strikes, for instance, occurred while the pilots were in the cockpits, preparing for take-off. Such wishful thinking may also have affected other decision-makers. The CIA's Richard Bissell and his deputy Tracy Barnes were men upon whom fortune had always smiled. Gifted with wealth and high ability, they had moved smoothly from Groton to Yale, and thereafter from success to success, often like Kennedy, in the face of considerable odds. Buoyed by their previous experiences, it was easy for them to assume that Castro was but another weak despot who would be no match for their craft. As one colleague recalled, they "just didn't contemplate losing." However, the thinking of the planners in Washington and the organizers in Miami did disturb another observer, a particularly wellinformed journalist, who warned a colleague shortly before the invasion: This explanation is less persuasive, however, for Kennedy made a number of major decisions concerning the operation outside of any given group. Furthermore, the action group involved displayed little of the cohesiveness or intolerance of criticism characteristic of groupthink. 48 Schlesinger has written that at the time he believed "the tide was flowing against the project.... Obviously no one could believe any longer that the adventure would not be attributed to the United States -news stories described the recruitment in Miami every day -but somehow the idea took hold around the Cabinet table that them to doubt the wisdom of interfering with the military experts once an operation was underway. Apparently forgotten, however, was the wisdom of doubting these experts before an operation ever got underway.52 Yet had the civilian leaders been skeptical enough to question the planners' optimistic assessments, and sought first-hand information on the actual preparation for the rescue mission, the shortcomings the White House would have discovered may well have prevented it from authorizing the mission at all.53
Thus, if the mistakes of the past are to be avoided, the Bay of Pigs fiasco must be fully understood. Needed then is more research, as well as more information than those limited amounts made available so far. Such knowledge will not benefit historians and political scientists alone; it may also prevent a future decisionmaker from echoing Kennedy's lament after the invasion: "How could I have been so stupid to let them go ahead?"54* 
